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Liability Of Municipal Corporations Under The
State's Statutory Waiver Of Tort Immunity
Schusterv. City of New York'
Plaintiff's intestate supplied information to the Police
Department which led to the arrest and imprisonment of
a dangerous and notorious criminal. His part in the
arrest was widely publicized, and he immediately received
numerous anonymous threats to his life. The police were
notified of the threats and for a short while provided for
his protection. The protection was then withdrawn although plaintiff's intestate protested that the threats continued. Three weeks after the criminal's arrest, plaintiff's
intestate was shot and killed on a street near his home.2
In a suit to recover damages, the complaint alleged, inter
alia, that the city negliigently failed to protect plaintiff's
intestate after it "requirod and exacted" his services as an
informer and had "actual and constructive knowledge"
that his life was endangered.3
The trial court granted a motion by the city to dismiss
the complaint as failing to state a cause of action.' The
intermediate appellate court affirmed, 4-1. 5 The Court of
Appeals divided 3-3 and, after appointing a justice to sit
on the case, ordered reargument. The Court of Appeals
then reversed the judgment of the lower court 4-3, holding
that the complaint stated a cause of action based on the
breach of duty by the municipality to exercise reasonable
care for the protection of a person in decedent's position.,
The Schuster case presents the problem of a municipal
corporation's liability for negligence under the statutory
waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability in
New York State.7 After exhaustively examining the history and status of governmental immunity from tort lia180 N.Y.S. 2d 265, 5 N.Y. 2d 75,154 N.E. 2d 534 (1958).
'For details of the crime, see the N.Y. Times, March 9, 1953, p. 1,
col. 8. The criminal in question was the celebrated Willie Sutton. Plaintiff's intestate was Arnold Schuster, of whom the Court, at page 268 said:
"There is no suggestion that Schuster was an underworld character. On the contrary, he appears to have been a public spirited young
man who had studied Sutton's picture on an FBI flyer that had been
posted in his father's dry-goods store . ..."
Newsweek Magazine, Vol. 39:38, March 24, 1952, reported that the killing
"aroused the most public feling since the Lindberg kidnapping".
' 207 Misc. 1102, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1953). The complaint alleged that
Sutton and his associates had "a special reputation for violence".
'Ibid.
'286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (1955).
'Supra, n. 1.
For an explanation and discussion of the statute, see infra, circa, n. 21.
1
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bility, Professor Borchard, a most influential writer on the
subject," concluded in 1924 that ". . . the law governing the
redress of the individual against the public authorities,
national, State, or municipal, for injuries sustained in the
exercise of governmental powers, is in a state of incongruity and confusion unique in history."9 The issues in the
Schuster case have their origin in this discord.
Governmental immunity from tort liability originated
in the English common-law maxim that "the King can do
no wrong". By way of "one of the mysteries of legal
evolution",1" this doctrine took democratic roots in the
theory that neither the United States nor one of the
several States could be sued without its consent. While
such consent has been, given in varying forms in all jurisdictions, suit against the government for its torts has not
generally been permitted.1 '
Much of the "incongruity and confusion" which has
followed this retention of governmental immunity is found
in the municipal area.'" The tort immunity of the States
8
.See, generally, 'Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J.
1, 129, 229 (1924) ; ]Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36
Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1927), 28 Col. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928) ; Blachly and
Oatman. Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative
Survey, 9 L. & C.]P. 181 (1942) ;David, Tort Liability of Local Government:
Alternatives to Immunity from Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1
(1959). See also PRossER, THE LAW op TORTS (2d ed., 1955), Ch. 24, § 109.
Borchard, op. cit., ibid, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 3.
1
oIbid, 4.
A recent notable exception is the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A.
1291 (1949), §§ 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-2680, which
provides for substantial federal liability. See Gellhorn and Schenk, Tort
Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Col. L. Rev. 722 (1947).
"It is quite obvious that the states ... do not even approach the position of the national government . . ." - Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort
Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1363, 1407 (1954). The authors,
at 1364, offer three reasons for the prevalence of immunity:
"(1) an amorphous mass of cumbrous language about sovereignity
and the nature of law which is usually contradictory within Itself and
is always contracdicted by such modern legal facts as the Federal Tort
Claims Act, the laws of most civilized nations other than our own,
the New York law, and lesser reforms in most of the other American
states;
(2) legislative and judicial inertia, which is probably the most potent
single explanation that anyone can give as to why the American law
is what it is; and
(3) financial fears, that the states and their sub-divisions actually
cannot afford, In the face of other more urgent demands upon their
treasuries, to pay out what they would be required to pay if tort
liability were accepted."
See also ,Schumate, Tort Claims Against State Governments, 9 L. & C.P. 242
(1942).
v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 131, 60 A.L.R.
12 In Hargrove
2d 1193 (Fla., 1957), the Court commented that "since 1900 well over
two hundred law review articles have been written on the subject." See
generally, Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
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was extended to their sub-divisions upon the tenets of an
early English case, Russell v. Devon.'8 However, legal
writers and the Maryland Court of Appeals 11 have pointed
out that the county in question in, the English case, which
was held non-liable for a breach of duty resulting in injury to a citizen, was unincorporated and without corporate funds, while municipalities and county commissioners
in this country are, without exception, incorporated and
possessed of corporate funds.
Nevertheless, municipal corporations, in the exercise of
governmental duties, as distinguished from proprietary
duties, enjoy tort immunity. The Maryland Court of Appeals has stated the general distinction: "Where the act...
is solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument
enuring to the municipality... and has in it no element of
private interest, it is governmental in its nature."' 5 Conversely, where the act is for the private benefit of the
municipality, the function is proprietary. 6
As a practical matter, however, this distinction has
often been distorted, by judicial efforts to effect a compromise between the rights of the injured individual and
the financial risk to the municipality: "When one reads
H'arv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Repko, American Legal Commentary on the
Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 L. & C.P. 214 (1942); Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability, 48 Mich L. Rev. 41 (1949) ; and Miller, Recent
Substantive Developments Affecting Municipal Tort Liability, 21 Cinn. L.
Rev. 31 (1952). Text sources are 18 MOQUILLIN, THE LAW OP MUNICIPAL
CORPOaATIONS (3d ed., 1950), ch. 53, §§ 23-59; and 2 ANTrIAU, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATION LAW (1958), chs. 11-13.
2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
"County Oommr's of A.A. Co. v. Duckett, 20 Md. 468, 479 (1864).
15Baltimore v. State, 173 Md. 267, 276, 195 A. 571 (1937).
16Mr. Clarke, infra, n. 19, examines with completeness and clarity the
classification of functions In Maryland. Parks, schools, police and fire
departments, and public buildings are the primary governmental functions;
and markets, removal of ashes and household refuse, streets, highways,
waterworks, and sewers are the predominent proprietary ones. Maryland
law in this area represents the great weight of authority. See Doddridge,
Distinction Between Governmental and ProprietaryFunctions of Municipal
Corporations,23 Mich. L. Rev. 325 (1925) ; and Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test, 22 Va.
L. Rev. 910 (1936).
Florida is the only state which has judicially toppled the governmental
proprietary distinction. In Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, supra, n. 12, the
Court said, 133:
"The modern city Is, In substantial measure a large business Institution. While it enjoys many of the basic powers of government, it
nonetheless is an incorporated organization which exercises those
powers primarily for the benefit of the people within the municipal
limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to the powers. To
continue ,to endow this type of organization with sovereign divinity
appears to us to predicate the law of the Twentieth Century upon
an Eighteenth Century anachronism."
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any opinion, it is usually appropriate to inquire whether
the city is immune because the function is governmental
or whether the function is governmental because the city
should be immune."'1 7 The inconsistent results of this
process have been uniformly criticized as "absurd and
unjust,"'" and there has been a persistent outcry for
remedial legislation. In Municipal Responsibility in Tort
in Maryland,9 George L. Clarke, taking a "critical view"
of that body of law, said that in this era of increasing social
consciousness and governmental activity, municipal immunity is "somewhat startling" since ". . . [the government's] purpose is not achieved when an individual member of the community, himself without fault, is made to
bear the entire cost
of the injury done him by a servant of
' 20
the community.
New York State took a singular step in 1929 when it
passed the Court of Claims Act, Section, 12a, waiving the
State's immunity from liability and consenting to have the
same "determined in accordance with the same rules of
law as applied to actions in the Supreme Court against
individuals and corporations".2 ' In Bernardine v. City of
New York, 22 this waiver was held to extend to municipal
corporations, thereby eliminating the governmental-proprietary distinction. Under familiar tort principles, the
city, like the individual and private corporation, would
be liable for negligence wherever it owed a duty to the
injured plaintiff.2 8
Less than six months after the Bernardine case, in
Steitz v. City of Beacon,24 the New York Court of Appeals,
1?Smith, 8upra, n. 12, 44.
Seasongood, supra, n. 16, 910. In Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128,
173 A. 56 (1934), the Court of Appeals found 'that the removal by the
municipality of a tree limb which protruded over a public footway involved the proprietary duty of keeping its streets safe, and that it would
be "illogical and unreasonable" to term it a governmental duty although
the same act, by the same employees, involved the governmental function
of maintaining a public park.
"3 Md. L. Rev. 159 (1939).
Ibid, 174. At 159, Mr. Clarke states:

"Legal writers everywhere have sensed the anomaly involved and,
almost uniformly have leveled shafts of criticism at the existing
situation. Each analysis and subsequent complaint recognizes the
omnipotence of atare deciala and the cry is for remedial legislation."
"NEW YORK LAWS 1939, ch. 360.
= 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604, 161 A.L.R. 364 (1945).
"In
Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173, 123 N.Y.S. 2d
485, 490 (1953), the Court said:
. . iIn each case the test now is whether an individual or private
corporation, assuming that he or it were obligated to discharge the
governmental duty involved, would be liable to the injured person
for a 'breach of that duty."
295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. 2d 704, 163 A.L.R. 342 (1945).
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in dismissing a complaint charging the city with negligently failing to keep in repair fire department water
pipes, stated that:
"Such enactments [i.e. those in the city charter
defining governmental powers] do not import intention
to protect the interests of any individual except as
they secure to all members of the community the
enjoyment of rights and privileges to which they are
entitled only as members of the public. Neglect in
the performance of such requirementscreates no civil
liability to individuals. * * * There was indeed a
public duty to maintain a fire department, but that
was all, and there was no suggestion that for any
omission ... the people of '25
the city could recover fire
damages to their property.
The Court reasoned that "[a]n intention to impose upon
the city the crushing burden of such an obligation should
not be imputed to the Legislature in the absence
of lan'26
guage clearly designed to have that effect.
In Murrain v. Wilson Line,27 where the police were
charged with failing to provide adequate protection to
people on a public pier, the Court, in dismissing the complaint, stated:
"The law is established that a municipality is answerable for the negligence of its agents in exercising
a proprietary function, and at least for their negligence
of commission in exercising a governmental function.., but a municipality is not liable for its failure
to exercise a governmental
function such as to provide
'28
police or fire protection.
Upon the distinctions drawn in the Steitz and Murrain
cases, it was held that where a village omitted the posting
of safeguards at the scene of an accident," and where the
police refused protection to a woman whose husband
previously made an attempt to take her life, 0 there was
IIbid.,

706. Emphasis supplied.
Supra, n. 24, 705.
270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 750 (1946), aff'd. 296 N.Y. 845, 72
N.E. 2d 29 (1947).
2Ibid,
753. Emphasis supplied.
Landby v. New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 199 Misc. 73, 105 N.Y. 2d 836
(1950), aff'd. 278 App. Div. 965, 105 N.Y.S. 2d 839 (1950), motion for
leave to appeal denied 303 N.Y. 1014, 102 N.E. 2d 840 (1951).
1Rocco v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 1012, 126 N.Y.S. 2d 198
(1953).
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no liability for injuries caused by the failure of police
protection.
However, where the city omitted to enforce a statute
prohibiting dangerous structures or public nuisances facing
the highway, " and where the state omitted to maintain
traffic control lights upon the highway as it was bound by
statute to do, "2 there was liability for the omission of a
governmental duty upon the determination of the court that
the intent of the statutes involved was to create a governmental duty to the individual.
Where a policeman negligently shot an intoxicated
tavern patron;" where three policeman negligently placed
an armed intoxicated fourth policeman into a taxi and
the fourth policeman shot the taxi driver;3 4 where a policeman negligently injured the plaintiff with a shot aimed at
a fleeing third person;35 and where the police negligently
returned a pistol to a man who subsequently killed himself and injured his wife;3" the commission of a wrong
(malfeasance) was the basis for liability.
In McCrink v. City of New York, 7 liability was founded
upon an allegation that the city "negligently failed to
discharge" a chronically incompetent policeman who,
while off-duty, shot plaintiff's intestate with the police
revolver he was required to carry with him at all times.
However, the Court implied that there was the commission
of a wrong in the "retention" of the policeman.
Manifestly, the effect of the Steitz and Murrain cases
was to reimpose municipal immunity, notwithstanding
the statutory waiver, where (1) the function was governmental, not proprietary; and (2) the duty was owing to
the general public, not to the individual; and (3) the
breach was one of omission, not commission. This tripartite test 38 of the municipality's liability was at the
center of the dispute in the Schuster case.
Supra, n. 23.
Foley v. State, 294 N.Y. 275, 62 N.E. 2d 69 (1945).
Flamer v. City of Yonkers, 309 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 2d 838 (1955).
"Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y. 2d 455, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 302
(1958).
"Wilkes v. City of New York, 308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E. 2d 338 (1954).
Benway v. City of Watertown, 1 App. Div. 2d 465, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 485
(1956).
8T296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E. 2d 419 (1947).
See Lloyd, Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi! (Municipal Tort Liability
in New York Sequel), 24 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 38 (1949); ANTIKU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW (1958), § 12.05; Notes and Comment, Tort
Liability of Municipal Corporationsin New York, 23 St. Johns L. Rev. 117
(1948).
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The trial court, in dismissing the complaint, said, that,
at the most, there was an, omission of police protection,
for which no liability could lie. 9 The intermediate appellate court affirmed on other grounds, but, by obiter dictum,
said that if there was a duty to protect an informer, such
a duty was court-created.4 0 Judge Beldock, in dissenting,
found a duty to plaintiff's intestate based upon the foreseeability of injury.4
The Court of Appeals,42 in reversing the judgment, advised that there could be no liability to the general public
from the failure of police protection. But, the Court said,
there is a ". . special duty to use reasonable care for the
protection of persons who have collaborated with it in the
arrest or prosecution of criminals, once it reasonably appears that they are in danger due to their collaboration."4
The Court offered two bases for this "special duty". First,
plaintiff's intestate's enforceable duty to aid in law enforcement, a duty "as old as history", created a reciprocalduty
on the part of the city to reasonably protect one who had
come to its assistance in this manner. Second, a "special
duty" arose from the active use made of plaintiff's intestate
by the city. The Court said that where the city has called
upon and used the citizen in aiding law enforcement: "'If
conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
[in furnishing police protection to such persons] would
commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a
benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury,
there exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go
forward'." 44 In effect, having "gone forward", the city's
subsequent omission to act becomes the commission of
a wrong.
The dissenting judges maintained that an enforceable
duty upon the individual to aid in law enforcement was
without statutory or judicial precedent, and that, therefore, there could be no reciprocal duty on the part of the
government. The "crushing" effects of the Court's holding were also feared. For example, Chief Justice Conway
said that to entitle the informer to "special" police protection would subject the municipality to "an unreasonable
"207 Misc. 2d 1102, 121 N.Y.S. 2d 735 (1953).
10286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778 (1955).
Judge Beldock's opinion is discussed in detail, infra, circa n. 51.
"180 N.Y.S. 2d 265, 5 N.Y. 2d 75, 154 N.E. 21 534 (1958). Two opinions,
concurred in by each of the four justices voting for reversal, were written.
Each of the three dissenting justices wrote a separate opinion, concurred
in by the others.
Ibid, 537.
Supra, n. 42, 538.
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burden . . . which would incapacitate the entire police
force and leave the general public without police protection", and Justice Froessel said that "the cost ... of such
protection would be incalculable".
In analyzing the effect of the holding in the Schuster
case, the weakness of the rationale behind the governmental duty to protect informers becomes apparent. First,
the legal structure of the reciprocal duty is unsound.
While the early common law of England recognized the
crime of misprision of felony, doubts have been expressed
45
whether mere nondisclosure ever constituted an offense.
6
In this country, with limited exception, misprision of
felony has not been recognized as a common law offense.416
The Supreme Court of the United States has said: "It may
be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to
proclaim every offence which comes to his knowledge; but
the law which would punish him in every'47case, for not performing this duty, is too harsh for man.
Second, no more persuasive is the Court's holding that
the city's active use of the citizen creates a relationship
whereby the omission in not affording police protection
becomes the commisson of a wrong. Elementary tort
principles - and New York case law48 - include the outlines of the principle involved, but the "obvious elusiveness
of [the] magic point"49 at which an omission becomes a
commission leaves its substance undefined and uncertain.
However, it is not suggested that the Court was unaware of the shakiness of its bases for liability. In fact, the
Court restricted the existence of the duty to those situations
where "it reasonably appears that they [the informers]
are in danger due to their collaboration". 0 This qualification, in the light of the special facts in the Schuster case,
clearly opens the way for future courts to distinguish
the degree of danger to future informers and reintroduce
non-liability. Plainly this was the intent of the Court "See PERKMNS, CEIMINIAL LAw (1957), ch. 5, § 3, 440.
"State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
'0'PERKINS, op. cit., supra, n. 45.
'"Marbury v. Brooks, 7 Wheat. 556, 575-6 (U.S. 1822).
Although the
United States Code (18 U.S.C.A. (1950) § 4) punishes whoever "conceals
and does not . . . make known" the commission of a felony, affirmative

concealment and suppression have been held to constitute the offense
and not mere nondisclosure. See Neal v. United States, 102 F. 2d 643
(8th Cir. 1939) ;and Bratton v. United .States, 73 F. 2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934).
8The Court relied heavily upon H. R. Moch. Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896, 62 A.L.R. 1199 (1928). See also Dunham
v. Village of Cantsteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 NB. 2d 872 (1952).
10Lloyd, supra, n. 38, 46.
10Supra, n. 42, 537.
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to find liability in the instant circumstances without surrendering the limitations on liability raised by the Steitz
and Murrain cases. By contriving a "special duty" to informers, and then emasculating its future applicability,
the Court managed its purpose. The broad extension of
liability, envisioned, in the dissents, would, appear to be
illusory. Judge Beldock, in his dissent in the intermediate
appellate court, had similarly reasoned that:
". .. the city's obligation to the intestate is not to
be measured by the requirement of 'special' police
protection.... Rather, under the circumstances ...
the city's obligation simply was to furnish the intestate
with such protection as would be adequate in view of
his known status as an informer upon a criminal who,
as a matter of common knowledge was extremely
dangerous. ** *51
"It is on this ground - the absence of knowledge of
the risk or danger to any particular individual - that
a municipality has been held not to be liable to a
person who is damaged by its negligence in the discharge of a statutory duty owing to the general public ... "52
Where the municipality has injured an, individual by
its failure to perform a governmental function, Judge
Beldock would, find liability wherever the injury was foreseeable. The Court found liability where the injury was
foreseeable and a "special duty" was owed the individual.
In rejecting Judge Beldock's reasoning and substituting a
"special duty", the Court, rather than engendering any
substantive change in municipal liability, reaffirmed the
Steitz and Murrain principles and brought into sharper
focus the practice of the Court under the tri-partite test.
In principle, the Court's unequivocal position is that
there can be no liability for the omission of a governmental duty owing to the general public. In practice, the
Court has demonstrated that it is able and inclined to use
the predicates of that position (i.e. the governmentalproprietary, general duty-individual duty, and omissioncommission distinctions) as it used, prior to the Bernardine
case,53 the bare governmental-proprietary distinction.
Where the facts allow any leeway, it appears that the
286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S. 2d 778, 782 (1955). Emphasis supplied.
Ibid., 786. Steitz and Murrain cases cited.
"294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. 2d 604, 161 A.L.R. 364 (1945).
2
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Court will weigh the interests involved and then fit a
finding of liability or non-liability into the tri-partite test.54
The history of municipal tort liability suggests that, as
a practical matter, the real dispute in the Shuster case was
over the degree of financial risk to the defendant municipality. The Court was convinced that the injury to plaintiff's intestate, together with the public policy interest in
encouraging the citizenry to aid in law enforcement, outweighed the financial risk to the city. To the dissenters,
the scale was balanced in the opposite direction.
The writer believes that the Schuster case, in ultimately
delineating the principles and practice of the Court in
determining municipal liability, invites criticism. In the
face of the unqualified legislative waiver of government
tort immunity, the Court's tenacious limitations on liability appear unjustified. While the financial feasibility of
complete liability is a cognizable and serious problem, 5
the presumption here must be that the New York legislature appreciated and assumed the risks implicit in its57
waiver. 6 The reappearance of an "artificial formula
(i.e. the tri-partite test) under which the Court will continue to juggle immunity and liability on a case by case
basis is an additional objection to the Court's position.
In Maryland, the Schuster case and New York's experiences with a statutory waiver of governmental tort immunity are only of academic significance. Municipal
"Lloyd, supra, n. 38, 50, describes the general duty-individual duty
and omission-commission distinctions as ". . . two generalized solving
formulae so indefinite and uncertain as to constitute fresh, untrammeled
Instruments of policy determination". The strategems of the Court in the
Schuster case, viz., the Individual or "special" duty to informers and the
omission of protection becoming the commission of -a wrong, seem to
illustrate the point.
mEven the most outspoken critics of governmental immunity recognize
that comprehensive statistical studies uncovering actual areas of financial
danger, if any, must precede remedial legislation. On the basis of studies
already undertaken, legal writers are confident that the risks are minimal.
In addition, many ways of obviating possible risks (e.g. insurance and
maximum recovery limits) have been suggested and discussed. See David,
Tort Liability of Local Government: -Alternatives to Immunity from
Liability or Suit, 6 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1959) ; Fuller and Casner, Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation,54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941) : French, Research
in Public Tort Liability, 9 L. & C.P. 234; MacDonald, The Administration
of a Tort Liability Law in New York, 9 L. & C.P. 262; fBorchard, Proposed
State and Local Statutes Imposing Public Liability in Tort, 9 L. & C.P.
282. Cf., Brown, Municipal Tort Liability, Some Observations, 30 N.Y.
State Bar Bulletin 433 (1958).
SANTiau, Op. cit. supra, n. 38, 119, observes that:
.. . If the determination of municipal responsibility In tort is for
the legislatures (as the courts continually Insist) then determination of
whether civic responsibility in a particular group of cases will constitute 'a crushing burden' is not for the conjecture of the courts."
SLloyd, Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Rai!, 24 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 38, 50 (1949).
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liability in Maryland follows a hardened path."s In a
recent case, State v. Baltimore County, 9 where plaintiff's
intestate was negligently killed by a policeman, the Court
of Appeals, in upholding the conventional governmentalproprietary distinction, stated:
"... the point was settled in the case of Wynkoop
v. Hagerstown, 159 Md. 594. * * * If, as the appellants
argue, the rule ought to be changed so as to enlarge
the liability of municipal corporations, it must be
done by the Legislature and not by this Court."6
If the Maryland Legislature should respond to a call for
remedial legislation, the Schuster case and New York's
experience with a statutory waiver of tort immunity will
serve as a timely warning that the courts will look for a
definite and clear statement of the extent of liability
undertaken.
KALMAN R. HrrLmAN

Unemployment Compensation -

Recovery Of

Benefits Paid
Waters v. State1
Appellant, who was employed by a radiator company,
was discharged on October 18, 1956, and promptly filed,
claim under the Unemployment Insurance Act.2 Subsequent to his receiving payments, an arbitrator, pursuant
to a collective bargaining agreement between the employer
and the union, directed that he be reinstated and "'be
made whole for the time lost by reason of his discharge.' "I
Pursuant to the order, appellant was reinstated and received $1,809.91 in back pay, no deduction being made for
T

See supra, n. 16. 'Statutory liability in Maryland Is confined to three
areas:
1) where employees of the government are Injured while engaged in
extra-hazardous work (Workmen's Compensation Act, 8 MD. CoDE (1957)
Art. 101, § 33) ;
2) where police commandeer a motor vehicle (6 MD. CoDE (1957), Art.
66%, § 180a, b) ;
3) where there Is destruction of property 'by riot or tumultuous assemblage (7 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 82, §§ 1-4).
'218 Md. 271, 146 A. 2d' 28 (1958).
Ibid., 273.
S220 Md. 337, 152 A. 2d 81- (1959).
D. CODE (1951) Art. 95A, now codified in 8 MD. CoDE (1957) Art. 95A.
Supra, n. 1, 340.

